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Abstract
Bureaucratic discretion and executive delegation are central topics in political economy
and political science. The previous empirical literature has measured discretion and
delegation by manually coding large bodies of legislation. Drawing from computational
linguistics, we provide an automated procedure for measuring discretion and delegation
in legal texts to facilitate large-scale empirical analysis. The method uses information
in syntactic parse trees to identify legally relevant provisions, as well as agents and
delegated actions. We undertake two applications. First, we produce a measure of
bureaucratic discretion by looking at the level of legislative detail for U.S. states and
find that this measure increases after reforms giving agencies more independence. This
effect is consistent with an agency cost model where a more independent bureaucracy
requires more specific instructions (less discretion) to avoid bureaucratic drift. Second,
we construct measures of delegation to governors in state legislation. Consistent with
previous estimates using non-text metrics, we find that executive delegation increases
under unified government.
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Introduction
The use of text data in political science has expanded rapidly in recent years (Gentzkow and
Shapiro 2010; Lucas, Nielsen, Roberts, Stewart, Storer and Tingley 2015; Roberts, Stewart,
Tingley, Lucas, Leder Luis, Gadarian, Albertson and Rand 2014; Grimmer and Stewart
2013), with notable examples including the detection of legislative agendas or topics and
estimating the ideological positions of parties (Laver and Garry 2000) or single legislators
(Lauderdale and Herzog 2016). The standard approach is to break down the syntactic
structure of the text and represent it as a sequence of tokens or phrases, thereby losing the
potentially vital information encoded in syntax and grammar. This paper shows how to
extract this syntactic information and bring it back into the analysis, paving the way for
richer text representations in political science.
With some exceptions, the mainstream approach to political text analysis is a bag-of-
words (or bag-of-phrases) representation. First, the text is split up into tokens (single words
or groups of words which relate to a concept) and filtering the set of informative tokens
(Monroe, Colaresi and Quinn 2008). Second, tokens are assigned a probability distribution
to analyze associations with a speaker, party, topic, or another covariate. In a nutshell,
this approach starts from text as unstructured data and transforms it into a frequency
distribution over tokens (Klebanov, Diermeier and Beigman 2008).
This mainstream approach potentially misses essential information in the text. Any piece
of written text comes with a language structure that conveys a potentially large amount of
lexical, syntactic, and semantic information.1 For example, we would want to know whether
mentions of the “governor” in state legislation have the governor as a subject (undertaking
an action) or an object (the target or recipient of an action). Here we explore how political
science research could benefit from taking this language structure of texts into consideration,
building on Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques.
By looking at the lexical and syntactic features of a sentence, NLP techniques serve to
retrieve richer information than a list of tokens. Our rule-based labeling approach (called
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‘information extraction’) starts by automatically parsing the lexical and syntactic structure
of a sentence, extracting information on what is the subject, what type of verb is present,
and so on. The structure is matched against frames, templates that determine what different
provision types look like lexically and syntactically. For example, sentences with "governor"
as subject and a strict modal verb (e.g., “governor shall enforce regulations”) can be un-
derstood as a delegation of authority to the role of governor. Our role labeling rules follow
dependency relations between words in a sentence and therefore are not constrained by word
order (as is the case with N-grams or dictionary matching). The result is a classification of
sentences according to their meaning, with information on the agents involved.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we validate the use of the parser-based
method for extracting measures of delegation from legislative texts. Second, we demonstrate
the usefulness of the method in two empirical applications using historical statutes data from
U.S. states.
To validate the method, we apply it to hand-annotated language features from Franchino
(2004), as well as our own additional hand-coding of legislative text. We document that the
information extraction method replicates human annotations more accurately than a simpler
lexicon-based method. The more basic strategy of counting modals tends to generate more
false positives. Still, the error rate for our method is not negligible, and in the appendix we
provide a discussion of cases where machine annotation disagrees with human annotation.
Our first empirical application looks at bureaucratic discretion in U.S. states. Moti-
vation comes from Huber and Shipan (2002), who find using manual coding of statutes
(the traditional method) that an independent bureaucracy may result in agency drift. As
such, legislators would want to put into place a series of control mechanisms to restrain
the bureaucracy, such as writing more detailed laws. To get at this question, we apply our
information extraction method to a unique corpus, which consists of the full text of U.S.
state session laws from the 20th century. We find that the introduction of merit systems,
namely independent bureaucracies, across U.S. states is associated with statutes containing
2
more legal provisions. This trend is consistent with the discretion model in the literature:
legislators introduce stronger ex-ante control mechanisms to discipline the more independent
bureaucracy.
The second application analyzes delegation of powers from the legislature to the governor.
The previous literature has used standard datasets to produce robust evidence that under
unified government (governor and legislature controlled by the same party), the delegation of
powers to the executive is more likely to take place (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Franchino
2004). Using a new measure of delegation constructed from the syntactic parse, we find
confirming evidence for this empirical regularity. In line with the previous literature, we find
that the number of statements delegating powers to the governor, discounted by statements
constraining the governor, increases in unified government situations.
In both of these applications, therefore, we find that previous results using standard
methods generalize to larger-scale text data sets using our information extraction method.
These consistent applications, along with our other validations, support the use of legislative
information extraction in future work. We hope that our information extraction approach
can expand the use of text analysis to a broader range of topics in political science.
Legislative Information Extraction
This section summarizes the method of legislative information extraction. The approach
relies on computational linguistics tools to produce parse data – statistical representations
of the syntactic and lexical content in legal clauses. For example, it will identify the subject
and verb of a sentence, the adjectives that describe the subject, and the objects of the verb.
Meanwhile, we construct role labeling rules – a set of tags or rules which identify relevant
clauses from the linguistics data – which, in our applications, provide measures of discretion
or delegation. For example, an extraction rule could be “governor subject with permissive
modal verb (e.g. may)”, which would indicate a permission for the governor. We apply
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these types of extraction rules to the parse data to construct datasets for empirical analysis.
The method can be understood as a form of rule-based semantic role labeling using the
domain-specific structure of legal language.
Automated methods to extract relevant information from legislative texts have recently
been used for both federal laws (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017) and state laws (Vakilifathi
2016). Vakilifathi (2016), the closest paper to ours, measures the level of statutory discretion
in statutes regulating charter schools by counting the number of mandatory and optional
statements, which are based on dictionaries of words and phrases. The author identifies these
statements mainly by looking at modal verbs, associating ‘shall’ to mandatory sentences
and ‘may’ to optional ones. She also includes in the analysis some alternative optional and
mandatory phrases. Our method has some advantages over this approach. Using parse
information and extraction rules (based on ontologies) allows us to filter out false positives:
the modal counting method would treat “shall not be expected” as mandatory, while our
extraction rules would not. 2
Syntactic Dependency Parsing
Automated legislative information extraction is possible because computers can now quickly
and reliably extract detailed lexical and syntactic information from large corpora. A key
technology in this area is syntactic dependency parsing, developed in computational linguis-
tics. Dependency parsing produces annotations on the syntactic structure of a sentence –
the words and the grammatical relations between them (Jurafsky and James 2000).
First, parsers tag the parts of speech (POS) – verb, noun, adjective, etc – of each word
in a sentence. This identifies the function of each word. Second, parsers tag dependencies –
the function relations between each word in the sentence. A dependency relation consists of
a headword and a dependent word, related to each other through a functional dependency.
Examples of functional dependencies are nominal subject (linking a subject and a verb),
direct object (linking a verb and a direct object), attribute (linking an adjective and the
4
noun it describes), and so on.
The dependency parser tells us whether a noun is the subject or the object of the sentence.
It tells us rich information about the verb – whether it is the main verb or just an auxiliary,
whether it is active or passive, and so on. A key category of verb in statutes is the modal verb,
which in legal language assigns responsibilities and grant permissions. These annotations
provide the ingredients from which our extraction rules build measures of delegation.
In the demonstrations reported below, our dependencies are produced using the Python
package spaCy (Choi, Tetreault and Stent 2015; Honnibal, Johnson et al. 2015). The spaCy
parser obtains state-of-the-art performance on the standard computational linguistics met-
rics. Like most parsers, it is trained on corpora of hand-parsed sentences (Goldberg and
Nivre 2012). We inspected many samples and were happy with its performance on statute
language. More detail is provided in the appendix.
Extraction Rules
A key step in legislative information extraction is to consider what information is available
from the syntactic parser and then to define a set of provision types that are relevant to the
research question (Soria, Bartolini, Lenci, Montemagni and Pirrelli 2007; Saias and Quaresma
2004). For example, one might be interested in statements that expand the governor’s powers,
versus statements that constrain them. With this goal in mind, one can identify a set of
lexical units that could serve as tags or rules for identifying relevant provisions (van Engers,
van Gog and Sayah 2004; Lame 2003). These extraction rules can then be applied to the
syntactic parser output to create the dataset for use in the analysis.
In most research, constructing extraction rules can be done using large-scale repositories
of coded ontologies. These are dictionaries of words and dependencies that have been anno-
tated to serve a theme, such as making a promise. An example of these ontology dictionaries
is FrameNet (Baker, Fillmore and Lowe 1998; Ruppenhofer, Ellsworth, Petruck, Johnson
and Scheffczyk 2006). Lexicons of synonyms and categories, such as WordNet (Miller 1995),
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can be useful for constructing ontologies. Other work that has engaged with legal provi-
sion types using syntactic features includes Lame (2003), Saias and Quaresma (2004), Ceci,
Lesmo, Mazzei, Palmirani and Radicioni (2011), and Ash, MacLeod and Naidu (2017).
Thanks to the linguistic regularities in legal language, the syntactic markers obtained
from dependency parsing can be used to label semantic roles. From an extensive examination
of example statements, we know (for example) that a subject attached to an active verb is
the agent. A (direct or indirect) object, in turn, is the patient. The use of modal verbs
"shall," "will," "must," "can," and "may" in legal language are universally deontic, whereas
in common language they would often refer to non-deontic cases such as conditional or
future tense. From these semantic labels, we construct the following categories: delegation,
prohibition, permission, and entitlement (see Table 1). In defining these legal provisions, we
start by deciding which modal and special verbs are associated with them. For instance, legal
provisions that delegate authority, such as “The Governor shall act.” These “delegations”
contain strict modals, such as ‘shall’ (unlike permissions, which would take a permissive
modal such a “may”). Unlike prohibitions (which are negative – e.g. “shall not”), delegations
are positive. Besides, delegations could be articulated through several “delegation verbs,”
such as ‘require,’ ‘expect’ and so on. An example of this would be ‘The Governor is expected
to.’
A detailed and reproducible articulation of the tags and rules underlying our extraction
rules may be found in Table 1. As enumerated in the table, a delegation is characterized by
one of two structures: 1) a non-negated strict modal followed by an active verb (‘Governor
shall act”), or 2) a non-negated non-permissive modal (either a non-modal or a strict modal)
followed by a delegation verb (“Governor is expected to”). Constraints are characterized
by 1) a negated modal (“Governor shall not”), a negated permission verb (“Governor is not
allowed”), or a non-negated constraint verb (“Governor shall be prohibited from”). Permis-
sions are characterized by a 1) non-negated permission verb (“Governor is allowed to”), 2) a
non-negated permissive modal followed by a non-special verb (“The Governor may act”),3,
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Table 1: Lexical Units and Pseudocode for Extraction Rules
Lexical Units
Strict modals ’shall’,’must’,’will’
Permissive modals ’may’,’can’
Delegation verbs ’require’, ’expect’, ’compel’, ’oblige’ , ’obligate’, ’have to’, ’ought to’
Constraint verbs ’prohibit’, ’forbid’, ’ban’, ’bar’, ’restrict’, ’proscribe’
Permission verbs ’allow’, ’permit’, ’authorize’
Extraction Rules
Delegation strict modal + active verb + not negationnot permissive modal + delegation verb + not negation
Constraint
modal + not delegation verb + negation
strict modal + constraint verb + not negation
permission verb + negation
Permission
permission verb + not negation
permissive modal + not special verb + not negation
constraint verb + negation
Entitlement
entitlement verb + not negation
strict modal + passive + not negation
delegation verb + negation
or a 3) negated constraint verb (“Governor is not prohibited from”). Finally, entitlements
are characterized by 1) a non-negated entitlement verb (“Governor retains the power to”),
2) a non-negated strict modal followed by a passive verb (“Governor shall be considered”),
or 3) a negated delegation verb (“Governor is not obligated to”).
A key feature of our approach, relative to lexicon-based approaches that for example
count modal verbs, is that the subject of any given legal provision is identified by the parser.
A potential issue in this regard is co-referencing: namely, the use of a pronoun as a subject
of a sentence which refers to a subject of a previous sentence. While coreference resolution
is a major problem in most language domains, such as newspaper articles (Van Atteveldt,
Kleinnijenhuis and Ruigrok 2008), legislation uses relatively few pronouns, making the iden-
tification of the subject of each sentence easier. In our case, we found in samples of the
data that our measures of delegation were unaffected by the use of co-reference resolution.
Therefore we chose not to run co-reference resolution on the whole corpus (which would have
been computationally demanding) for this analysis.
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As mentioned, this process is similar to semantic role labeling (SRL). Semantic role label-
ing software, such as AllenNLP’s implementation of PropBank, would serve to identify “who
does what to whom” by labeling agents, patients, and associated verbs. The information
from SRL, along with the modality modifier, could in principle deliver equivalent information
for use in extracting legal provisions. But in our experiments comparing an SRL approach
to the dependency-parse approach, we got better results with the latter for legal language.
Our sense is that SRL annotates subtler relations in sentences, which are less transparent
and rely more on the specific features of the training corpus. The training corpus for SRL is
non-legal language, and we have not fully assessed the performance of off-the-shelf SRL on
legal language. In contrast, we have analyzed many samples of dependency parsing on legal
language and were pleased with the results. It is necessary to note that our legal ontology
would not work well on non-legal language. We expect that techniques such as SRL will be
needed to extend these methods to broader language domains.
Validation
In this section, we provide some validation for our method in the context of identifying
delegations and constraints in texts. First, we compare our machine-annotated counts to
hand-annotated counts from a previous paper (Franchino 2004). Second, we compare it to
the lexicon-based strategy of counting modals.
To compare machine annotations to hand annotations, we apply our information extrac-
tion technique to the corpus from Franchino (2004). This dataset contains more than 150
European Communities (EC) legislative acts, hand-coded with the number of delegations
and constraints. Our machine coding identifies delegations and constraints by counting the
number of matches to the respective rules articulated in Table 1.
Figure 1 Panel A shows the binned scatterplot of the relationship between our machine-
annotated counts (horizontal axis) and Franchino’s hand-annotated counts (vertical axis) for
delegations. The measures are strongly correlated, with an R2 of 0.44. We can see that the
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machine-coded measure identifies about twice as many delegations as the hand annotations,
probably because the human annotators treated related/redundant statements as a single
delegation.
Figure 1 Panel B shows the same figure for constraints. While the measures are corre-
lated, the performance is much lower, with R2 = 0.06. Again, the machine coding measure
identifies more constraints than hand-coding. The low R2 for constraints may be due to the
subjective nature of coding constraints in the EU data (Franchino 2004). In the future, we
should work further on validating the constraint measure in the U.S. state context.
Next, we compare our method for measuring delegations to a more standard lexicon-
based approach based on counting modal verbs. For this validation exercise and the empirical
demonstrations below, we use a unique dataset consisting of the full text of U.S. state session
laws from the 19th century to the 21st century. This corpus, introduced by Ash (2016),
consists of all the new statutes enacted by a legislature during a session, which are published
annually or biennially. We process this raw data by removing all non-statute material from
the texts and merging them.
For the validation check, we follow our method and compute the number of delegations
with “governor” as the subject on the U.S. state session laws corpus. This gives a count of
sentences matching our extraction rule for delegations for each state and each biennium for
the years 1900-2010. The lexicon-based comparison is the count of the bigrams “governor
shall” and “governor will.”
These measures are highly correlated, as one would expect from the similarity of the
definition. However, we find that they result in different time series in our corpus. Figure
2 shows the ratio of the lexicon-based measure to the parser-based measure along with
95% confidence intervals. The figure shows that (although decreasing over time) the ratio
is always statistically greater than one, suggesting that simply counting modals tends to
generate false positives.
In the Appendix, we provide further validation of our method. We blind hand-coded a
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Figure 1: Validation with Franchino (2004): Delegation and Constraint Counts
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Figure 2: Modal Counts tend to Generate False Positives
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sample of delegations and find that our parser agrees with the human annotations over 80
percent of the time. The parse measure produces fewer false positives and false negatives than
a lexicon-based measure counting modals. We also provide some examples of false positives
and negatives generated by our method and we acknowledge some limitations which would
require further work on the extraction rules.
Bureaucratic Discretion in U.S. States
In recent decades, the literature on bureaucracy has focused on whether and how politi-
cians delegate tasks to bureaucrats. In particular, they look at what control instruments
legislators put in place to manage policy implementation (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984;
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Levine and Forrence 1990; Epstein and O’Halloran
1994; Martin 1997; Gailmard and Patty 2012). On a leading framework for this process,
legislators can use either ex-ante or ex-post control mechanisms (Martin 1997). Ex post
control mechanisms refer to backward-looking incentives, such as firing bureaucrats who
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fail to implement a policy correctly. Ex-ante mechanisms are more forward-looking and try
to structure the bureaucracy to maintain the desired policy. These include administrative
procedures (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987), for example, and the level of detail of
legislation. Detailed laws can be used to micro-manage policy implementation (Huber and
Shipan 2002). The delegation literature studies whether these two types are substitutes or
complements (Huber and Shipan 2008).
We build on these ideas to analyze the introduction of an independent bureaucracy. These
reforms weaken the legislators’ capacity to control bureaucrats ex-post, so legislators might
write more detailed legislation as a form of ex-ante control. As a set of natural experiments,
we study the introduction of merit systems in the civil service in U.S. states (Volden 2002;
Wood and Bohte 2004). Note that an alternative expertise model of civil service reform
would predict that legislation might become less detailed, if increased professionalism among
bureaucrats means they need less legislative guidance.
The first step in this analysis is to measure legislative detail, which is central in analyzing
bureaucratic discretion. A leading analysis in this area is Huber and Shipan (2002), who
examine variation in detail of the statutes implementing the federal Medicaid program across
U.S. states. First, they select the relevant statutes for Medicaid by searching legal databases.
Second, they use manual annotation to distinguish between procedural and policy language in
the statutes. They argue that procedural language is less constraining than policy language
because
a bureaucrat can comply with the need to write a report or to consult particular
groups or to conclude his or her work in a specified time period without being
sharply constrained with respect to the policy implemented. But if the statute
says to do X, the bureaucrat cannot do Y (at least without some risks) (Huber
and Shipan 2002, p.48).
They then measure discretion quantitatively. As a baseline, they use a simple length-based
measure of legislation as a proxy for the discretion left to bureaucrats: the longer the statutes,
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the greater the effort to reduce discretion. In addition, they look at the share of policy
language, which gives less discretion.
The approach in our paper is a compromise between a length-based baseline and a hand-
annotated measure like policy-vs-procedure share. On the one hand, the length of legislation
alone is missing a lot of linguistic detail and treats legally relevant statements identically to
boilerplate and other irrelevant text. On the other hand, the distinction between procedural
and policy language is costly to annotate, somewhat subjective, and cannot be easily applied
to other cases. We build at this intersection by looking for legally (rather than policy) relevant
information from texts. Applying the information extraction techniques described above, we
count the most common types of legal provisions listed in Table 1 (delegations, constraints,
permissions, entitlements).
Formally, our outcome is log (LegalProvisionsst), the logged number of legal provisions
in the statutes of state s for each biennium t. We test the effect of the introduction of
an independent bureaucracy on this outcome, where more provisions means less discretion.
We analyze 50 U.S. states from 1900 to 2000. The Appendix reports some results using
alternative text measures of discretion.
The estimating equation is
log (LegalProvisionsst) = αMeritst + βXst + γs + δt + φst+ εst (1)
where, Meritst is the variable which measures the introduction of a comprehensive merit
system, Xst is a vector of time-varying state characteristics, γs and δt are state and time (bi-
ennium) fixed effects, and φst represents state-time trends. The state fixed effects control for
time-invariant state characteristics, while year fixed effects address any factors that change
over time, but not across states, such as influence from the federal level.1 The state trends
allow for confounding trends at the state level. The equation is estimated using the reghdfe
1In particular, we can rule out influences from vertical delegation of powers from the federal to the state
level. Assuming that the delegation of competences from the federal to the state level occurs at the same
time for all the states, time fixed effects control for this.
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Stata package (Correia 2016) and standard errors are clustered to allow serial correlation
within state.
Table 2: Civil Service Reform and Legislative Detail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leg Detail Leg Detail Leg Detail Leg Detail Leg Detail -Repeal
Civil Service 0.137 0.112 0.157 0.147 0.131
(0.0625) (0.0643) (0.0646) (0.0705) (0.0588)
Introduction of Drafting System 0.0755 0.111 0.0775 0.0764 0.0820
(0.0807) (0.0766) (0.0804) (0.0804) (0.0783)
Divided Government -0.0256 -0.0153 -0.0255 -0.0359 -0.0255
(0.0294) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0308) (0.0285)
Observations 1,438 1,382 1,438 1,438 1,485
R-squared 0.838 0.814 0.838 0.838 0.838
State FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
State-Specific Trends X X X X
Lagged DV X
Interaction X
Reform Year X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state and biennium fixed effects, time-varying controls
(introduction of drafting system and divided government) and state-specific time trends. Column 2 adds the lagged dependent
variable (without state-specific time trends). Columns 3 and 4 use the same specification of Column 1, but respectively add
a dummy variable for the reform year and the interaction between divided government and the introduction of the merit
system. Column 5 uses as treatment variable the introduction and the repeal of merit system. In all models standard errors
are clustered by state.
Table 2 shows the results for the fixed-effects estimates of Equation (1). The introduction
of the civil service is statistically associated with higher levels of detail in legislation (Column
1). The coefficient and standard errors are robust across specifications, including state trends
and controls for Divided Government (Column 2). There is no change from adding the lagged
dependent variable (Column 3), addressing the issues of long-term serial correlation in state
panel data documented by Caughey, Xu and Warshaw (2017). Adding a separate dummy
variable for the year of the reform (Column 4) does not change the results either, meaning
that the effect happens after the introduction of the merit system and not contemporaneously
with it. The results do not change when interacting the treatment with Divided Government
(Column 5), meaning that our results are not driven by the correlated changes in government
structure. Finally, in Column 6 we also include in the treatment variable repeals of the merit
14
Figure 3: Event Study Graph
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Notes: Event study graph for effect of civil service reform on legislative detail. Dots give the binned mean
residuals of log provision counts (vertical axis) from a regression on state fixed effects, biennium fixed
effects, and state trends, binned by the bienniums before and after the reform (horizontal axis). Error
spikes give 90% confidence intervals from standard errors of the mean.
system (which occurred in 15 states from 1996), finding similar results.
The dynamics of this effect are illustrated in Figure 3. The event study graph plots the log
provision count (residualized on state/time fixed effects and state trends, corresponding to
Column 2 of Table 2), binned by biennium, for the two bienniums before and two bienniums
after civil service reform. The plot suggests no pre-trend, with an increase in legislative detail
taking place the next biennium after the introduction of an independent bureaucracy.
After the establishment of an independent bureaucracy, legislators start writing more
detailed statutes. This finding is consistent with the idea that more independent bureau-
crats are prone to agency drift, so legislators tend to micro-manage policy implementation.
Without ex-post control mechanisms (such as firing bureaucrats at will), legislators start
putting in place ex-ante control mechanisms (more detailed legislation). The data do not
support the alternative professionalism model, where expert bureaucrats would require less
legislative guidance.
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An additional set of model specifications and robustness checks are reported in the Ap-
pendix, which shows the results for the regression models with different types of provisions as
dependent variables. Results are robust across types, suggesting an increase in entitlements,
permissions, constraints, and delegations associated with the introduction of an independent
civil service. In addition, we test whether divided government affects legislative complexity
in those years where the merit system was not in place. Results show that in those years
there is no effect of divided government on legislative complexity, providing further evidence
that divided government is not driving the results.
Executive Delegation in U.S. States
A consistent prediction from delegation models is that when preferences between principal
and agent converge, more delegation will take place (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002, 2008).
Empirical support for this prediction includes Volden (2002), who studies welfare boards
in U.S. states. He finds that, when the preferences of the legislature and the governor are
aligned (that is, they come from the same party), legislators tend to give governors more
appointment power over welfare boards.
The work on delegation is part of the broader literature on the powers of governors, such
as appointment powers, control over the budget, term limits, and so on (Beyle 1990, 2007;
Krupnikov and Shipan 2012; Kousser and Phillips 2012).
Another way of analyzing delegation to governors is to look at the content of legislation
that delegates powers (Huber and Shipan 2008). Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) introduce a
measure of statutory executive delegation which considers two components.2 First, the degree
of authority delegated to the executive branch, measured by the proportion of provisions in
a legislative act delegating policy authority. Second, the degree of constraints imposed on
the executive branch, measured by the number of constraints imposed in legislation. The
2In the original work this is referred to ‘statutory executive discretion’ and not ‘statutory executive
delegation’, but in this work we use the latter to avoid confusion with the measure of discretion used in the
first analysis.
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total measure of statutory executive delegation is given by the share of provisions delegating
powers in an act, weighted by the constraints imposed on executive action.
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) apply this measure to the delegation of powers from U.S.
Congress to the president. They find less delegation under divided government. Franchino
(2004) extends this analysis to delegation of powers in the European Union. He looks at the
Council of Ministers (the EU’s equivalent to a second legislative chamber) and finds they
delegate more to the Commission (the equivalent of the executive) where Member States’
preferences converge.
This previous work has computed delegation through a combination of qualitative and
quantitative methods. First, they identified relevant pieces of legislation, according to some
guidelines, such as previous research (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) or the relevant jurispru-
dence (Franchino 2004). Second, they manually code provisions according to whether they
grant policy discretion or not. Finally, they identify potential categories of procedural con-
straints and manually count their frequency in the documents. This approach has some
limitations. Perhaps most importantly, it is time and resource-intensive. Manual coding
requires expert knowledge of the legal documents and associated legal system. The coders
must go through hundreds of documents and preferably cross-validate results. In addition,
manual coding requires subjective judgments on a series of important factors: which docu-
ments to sample, which statements are relevant, what the potential categories of procedural
constraints look like, and so on. The method is necessarily domain-specific, which limits
opportunities for clean replication.
The time and resource requirements of hand-coding legislative clauses can be ameliorated
by machine learning from labeled documents. O’Halloran, Maskey, McAllister, Park and
Chen (2016) is a promising example of this approach. However, machine classification does
not address the issue of subjective judgments in labeling the documents. Besides, there is
still the problem that documents labeled in one legal context would not be valid for machine
classification in other legal contexts. We view the rule-based information extraction method
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and the machine learning method as complementary approaches.
In this section we aim to address some of these issues using legislative information ex-
traction. The empirical context is legislation in U.S. states, and our outcome of interest is
delegation to the governor. Following Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Franchino (2004),
Delegationst to the governor of state s at biennium t is computed as
Delegationst =
Dst
Mst
− Cst
Mst
· Dst
Mst
, (2)
where Dst is the number of delegation statements with governor as subject, Mst is the
total number of statements in that session’s legislation, and Cst is the number of constraint
statements with governor as subject.3 This is the delegation ratio minus the constraint ratio
(weighted by the delegation ratio). In the Appendix, we report similar results for alternative
outcome specifications that ignore constraints and/or use the number of provisions with
governor as subject (rather than all provisions) as the denominator Mst.
Figure 4 illustrates how these factors have evolved over time in the U.S. state session
laws for the years 1900-2000. The left panel shows that the delegation ratio had a mostly
flat trend roughly until WWII, then an increase in delegation until the 1980s, and then
again a decreasing trend starting in the 1990s. These trends for governors are similar to
the delegation trends at the federal level documented by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999, Fig.
5.10, p. 138). The right panel shows the evolution of the constraint ratio, which was flat
until the 1950s but then began a positive trend. Again, this is similar to trends at the federal
level Epstein and O’Halloran (1999, Fig. 5.11, p. 139). Moreover, these trends are broadly
in line with anecdotal evidence on the powers of governors provided by the literature. Ruhil
and Camões (2003) argues that the powers of governors increased after the Great Depression,
while Rosenthal (1982) argues that powers became more balanced starting in the 1980s.
3Note that this formula is slightly modified from that used by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and
Franchino (2004). They compute delegation as Y = DM − CK · DM , where K is the number of possible
constraints. The choice of K requires expert knowledge of the possible set of constraints and is not feasible
to do in our diverse context (50 states, 100 years).
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Figure 4: Average Delegation and Constraint Ratios in State Session Laws, 1900-2000
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These descriptive statistics are promising initial support for our method. But our main
inquiry is whether the previous evidence on unified government and delegation to the gover-
nor can be replicated using the new text-based measure. If our measure is valid, we would
expect a positive relationship between government unity and statutory executive delegation.
To measure unified government, we use data from Klarner (2003) for the years 1935
through 2010. While we experiment with different specifications in the appendix, our pre-
ferred measure Unifiedst takes value one when a single party (Democrat or Republican)
controls the governorship and both chambers of the legislature in state s during biennium
t. If at least one of the three government bodies is controlled by a different party, it takes
value zero.
Our estimating equation is
Delegationst = αUnifiedst + βXst + γs + δt + φst+ εst (3)
where as before, Xst is a vector of time-varying state characteristics, γs and δt are state and
time (biennium) fixed effects, and φst represents state-time trends. Controls include the
introduction of the civil service because, as seen above, it affects the number of provisions
in the statutes. As before, standard errors are clustered by state.
Table 3 shows the results of the fixed effects regression from Equation (3). A positive
relationship is present between unified government and executive delegation, which suggests
that where a single party controls the legislature and the executive, legislators tend to del-
egate more powers to the executive. Results are robust to different specifications, including
the inclusion of state time trends (Column 2), the lagged dependent variable (Column 3),
and controls for civil service reform (Column 4). The preferred specification is robust to spec-
ifying the outcome as just the delegation ratio (Column 5), as well as using just governor
statements (rather than all statements) as the denominator (Column 6).
In conclusion, we find evidence for a positive relationship between unified government and
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Table 3: Effect of Unified Government on Executive Delegation to the Governor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Exec Del Exec Del Exec Del Exec Del Del Ratio Del Ratio Gov
Unified Govt 0.0054 0.0046 0.0045 0.005 0.00678 0.008
(0.003) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.004)
Observations 2,270 2,270 2,185 2,223 2,223 2,221
R-squared 0.396 0.464 0.434 0.463 0.529 0.328
State FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
State Trends X X X X
Lagged DV X
Civil Service X X X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state and biennium fixed effects.
Column 2 adds state-specific time trends and Column 3 adds the lagged dependent variable. Column 4
adds the introduction of an independent civil service as control. Column 5 and Column 6 use ‘Delegation
Ratio’ and ‘Delegation Ratio Gov’ as dependent variable, respectively. In all models standard errors are
clustered by state.
the statutory executive delegation to the governor. In other words, when the legislators and
the governor are from the same party and hence they converge in their policy preferences, the
former delegate more powers to the latter. This is in line with the findings of an extensive
set of previous delegation studies and hence lends support to our information extraction
approach to measure executive delegation.
Conclusion
In this work, we introduce a new approach to political text analysis – instead of a bag-of-
words text representation, we look at richer language representations. By looking at the
lexical and syntactic features of texts, we can classify statements according to more refined
meaning. We show how to retrieve some legal provisions, namely delegations, entitlements,
and constraints, from legal texts.
We illustrate the validity of this approach by analyzing two predictions in the literature.
First, the introduction of a merit system in the civil services of US states is associated with
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an increase in the number of legal provisions contained in statutes. Second, the number of
provisions delegating powers to the governor in U.S. state session laws is associated with
government unity.
This is only one of the many potential contributions computational linguistics can make to
social research. In future research we shall use lexical and syntactic information in legal texts
to distinguish contingent clauses, namely those clauses which specify different realizations
of states of the world, from non-contingent clauses (or spot clauses) and test the differential
effects of these types of clauses on productivity and economic growth. In this way, we will
empirically answer a key question in political economy, namely whether more regulation is
good or bad for the economy and when.
Our approach can also be used to extract information about exceptions, loopholes or
suspensions from legal texts. Recent work in legal studies uses an approach similar to
the one discussed above to extract suspension norms (Ceci et al. 2011; Palmirani, Ceci,
Radicioni and Mazzei 2011). Other work has tried to retrieve exceptions, which are another
sub-category of efficacy provision and represent a modification of the norm where the rules
are restricted with respect to the original scope (Palmirani et al. 2011). Loopholes have also
been recently studied in tax legislation from a computational linguistic perspective. This
focus can be interesting for political scientists studying the effect of gridlock and vetoes on
decision-making, a growing area of scholarship.
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Syntactic Parsing
The final stage of the process is to match the lexical and syntactic structure of the provision
types with that of the sentences in the text. We then extract the number of delegations,
prohibitions, and so on for each jurisdiction and over time. We also have material associated
information, such as who or what is the subject of the provision. For example, in the second
application below, we identify provisions where the subject is for the term ‘governor.’ 1
Although several parsing methods are present, we use dependency parsing, as suggested
by recent developments in NLP (Dell’Orletta, Marchi, Montemagni, Plank and Venturi,
2012, Montemagni and Venturi, 2013). The parser models sentence structure over the words
contained in the sentence and the grammatical relations between them (Jurafsky and James,
2000). A dependency relation consists of a headword and a dependent word, related to each
other through a functional dependency. Examples of functions are nominal subject, direct
object, and so on. More formally, a dependency structure G = (V,A) consists of vertices V ,
the set of words in a sentence, and arcs A, the head-dependent and grammatical relations
(Jurafsky and James, 2000, Choi and Palmer, 2012). Usually, dependencies are displayed
as (projective) ‘parse trees’, which represent the relations between words in a recursive
hierarchical structure. Dependency trees are graphs where: 1) there is a single head, with no
incoming arc; 2) each vertex (apart from the head) has at least one incoming arc; 3) there is
a unique path from the root node to each vertex (Jurafsky and James, 2000, Goldberg and
Nivre, 2012). In the Appendix, we show an example of a dependency parse tree.
The widely used transition-based parsing algorithm works as follows (Jurafsky and James,
2000, bird, klein and loper, 2009, Goldberg and Nivre, 2012, Honnibal, Johnson et al., 2015).
The input is a list of tokens. The algorithm works through three transition operators, applied
to the list of tokens: 1) the LEFT action asserts a head-dependent relation between the top
word in the ‘stack’ (the list of words yet to be processed) and the one beneath and removes
1A subtler approach in future work could identify synonyms for governor, using WordNet or using word
embeddings (Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado and Dean, 2013).
2
the lower word from the stack; 2) the RIGHT action asserts a head-dependent relation
between the first and second words in the stack and removes the word at the top; 3) the
SHIFT action removes the word from the initial list of tokens and places it into the stack.
To speed up the parser, the algorithm is greedy: once a dependency has been assigned,
the token is removed from the stack and cannot be reassigned. For every token in the
sentence, the parser consults a rulebook (the so-called ‘oracle’) that returns a transition
(LEFT, RIGHT, or SHIFT) based on the current state. This ‘oracle’, a key piece of the
parser software, is constructed by the developers to optimize accurate parsing based on
training data.
The parser is trained on an annotated corpus of standard English articles. This corpus
does not include legal documents. But we find that it does quite well on most sentences in
our corpus of statutes.
We apply these parser methods to the text of state statutes. Although several implemen-
tations are available, such as SyntaxNet, NLTK, and CoreNLP, in this work we use spaCy,
one of the most accurate and fastest parsers available today (Choi, Tetreault and Stent, 2015,
Honnibal, Johnson et al., 2015). 2 After each sentence is parsed, we match up the extracted
dependency relations to our set of syntactic units for delegations, prohibitions, and so on.
If a sentence matches one of these categories, it is counted as a legal provision. To measure
legislative detail, we count the number of legal provisions published in the state session laws
for each state and each biennium.
The following sentences are from the California Government Code 11508 - (a) and 65852
- (a): “The agency shall consult the office, and subject to the availability of its staff, shall
determine the time and place of the hearing”; “A local agency may, by ordinance, provide for
the creation of accessory dwelling units in areas zoned to allow single-family or multifamily
2spaCy uses a transition-based approach, similar to the one described above (Choi and Palmer, 2012).
The ‘oracle’ used by spaCy is from Goldberg and Nivre (2012). Several minor technical features make
spaCy more complex than a simple transition-based parser, such as the use of an improved non-monotonic
transition system, which relaxes the greedy algorithm approach and allows the parser to ‘go back’ on its
decisions (Honnibal, Johnson et al., 2015).
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use”. Below in Figure A1, we provide the dependence trees for parts of these two sentence.
3 The letters below the words represent the part of speech (POS) tags. A prerequisite of
syntactic dependency parsing, indeed, is POS tagging. The latter assigns labels (‘tags’) to
the tokens in a sentence according to their function, such as noun, verb, and adjective.4 For
instance, in the sentence above, ‘(the) agency’ is a noun and ‘consult’ is a verb. Although
POS tagging provides important information on the single token, it does not say much about
the token’s relations with the other tokens in a sentence. This is where dependency parsing
comes into play.
The arcs above the sentence in Figure 1a represent the syntactic relations between words.
First of all, the parser identifies the head of the sentence, normally the main verb (‘consult’
and ‘provide’, respectively in the first and second sentence). The parser then identifies
the subject of the sentence (‘the agency’ and ‘a local agency’, respectively in the first and
second sentence) through the nominal subject (nsubj) relation. The subject may also be a
clause. Finally, the parser looks at the other side of the sentence and, in the case of the
second sentence, identifies two prepositions, namely ‘for’ and ‘of’, and two objects of this
preposition, namely ‘the creation’ and ‘accessory dwelling units’, or in the case of the first
sentence, directly the object ‘the office’. 5
As it can be seen, the first sentence is a delegation, as it is an active and positive sentence
which contain a strict modal, namely ‘shall’. This is close in spirit to the ‘the Agent shall
act’ example of delegation provided above. Conversely, the second sentence is a permission,
as it is positive and active, with a permissive modal, namely ‘may’, followed by a normal
verb. This is very similar to the ‘the Agent may act’ example of permission discussed above.
Table 1 shows an example of the results of the data building step (i.e. a single observation
in the new dataset created). This is an example of a permission, with governor as subject. In
this case the Governor is allowed to give the prize ‘Arkansas Traveler’ to every individual she
3This figure is taken from displaCy, a graphical interface for Spacy, the dependency parser used here.
4A full list of POS tags can be found here (accessed June 2017).
5 A full list of dependencies can be found in De Marneffe and Manning (2008).
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(a) Delegation
(b) Permission
Figure 1: Dependency Parse Tree
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Table 1: Example of Permission
Full sentence
[...]the Governor of the State of Arkansas be authorized to designate and appoint
distinguished visitors, citizens, and former citizens, who have distinguished
themselves in various fields of endeavor as an Arkansas Traveler
Subject tags ’DT’, ’NNP’, ’IN’, ’DT’, ’NNP’, ’IN’, ’NNP’
Subject branch ’the’, ’governor’, ’of’, ’the’, ’state’, ’of’, ’arkansas’
Verb ’authorize’
Permission verb True
Passive True
Subject ’Governor’
Object tags
[’IN’], [’TO’, ’VB’, ’CC’, ’VB’, ’JJ’, ’NNS’, ’,’, ’NNS’, ’,’, ’CC’, ’JJ’, ’NNS’, ’,’,
’WP’, ’VBP’, ’VBN’, ’PRP’, ’IN’, ’JJ’, ’NNS’, ’IN’, ’NN’,
’IN’, ’DT’, ’NNP’, ’NNP’, ’,’], [’VB’]
Object branches
[’that’], [’to’, ’designate’, ’and’, ’appoint’, ’distinguished’,
’visitor’, ’,’, ’citizen’, ’,’, ’and’, ’former’, ’citizen’, ’,’, ’who’, ’have’,
’distinguish’, ’-pron-’, ’in’, ’various’, ’field’, ’of’, ’endeavor’, ’as’,
’an’, ’arkansas’, ’traveler’, ’,’], [’be’]
feels worthy of this award. One of the main advantages of the new approach proposed above
is that not only does it allow classifying statements according to their content, but it also
allows to detect the subject of the statement. This in turn allows to extrapolate information
on who is bound or entitled to do what.
We inspect a random sample of 500 provisions to understand how the different extraction
rules apply. In this sub-sample there are 45 permissions, 74 delegations, 63 entitlements
and 10 constraints. Almost 40 per cent of the sample is covered by our extraction rules.
Most of the sentences not detected by our extraction rules are procedural provisions, mostly
amendments, repeals or provisions discussing the application of the law. An example of
amendment is: “Section twenty-six-a of such law is amended by adding a new subdivision
fourteen to read as follows”. An example of repeal is: “Section 19-418a of the general
statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof”. This is an example of a
provision discussing the entering into force of an act: “This act is effective immediately upon
completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8
of the Wyoming Constitution”. These provisions contain important legal information, but do
not affect the level of discretion left to bureaucrats or even the power delegated to a specific
6
governmental body.
7
Further Validation
We carried out blind hand-coding on a sub-sample of provisions delegating authority to the
governor according to the instructions used in Epstein and O’Halloran 1999 book (p.398).
In those instructions, a delegation is defined as ‘any provisions that gives the [governor] the
authority to move policy away from the status quo’. Examples provided are: the autho-
rization of a new program, discretion to make or modify decision-making criteria, creation
of a new commission, board, agency etc. Then, we run some tests to validate our parser
measure: the precision score (number of true positives over number of true positives and
false positives) is 0.81, recall (number of true positives over number of true positives and
false negatives) is 0.92 and f1-score (harmonic mean of precision and recall) is 0.86. Overall,
our parser measure replicates the hand coding quite well.
Here is an example of a true positive, from a 1965 statute from Illinois: “Within sixty
days after this act becomes effective, the governor, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint three commissioners to enter into a compact on behalf of the state
of Illinois with the state of Missouri.” This clearly falls within one of the main examples of
delegation provided in the Appendix of the Epstein and O’Halloran 1999 book: “the creation
of a new commission, board, or agency” (p.293). It should be noted that our parser measure
correctly identifies in this case the governor as the subject of the sentence and hence the
government body to which authority is delegated.
A lexicon measure looking for the bi-gram ‘governor shall’ will produce a false negative
in the example above. A lexicon measure will also produce many false positives, as shown in
this example: “The terms of office of the members of the commission to be appointed by the
governor shall be for six years”. In this case, a lexicon measure will detect this provision as
a delegation to the governor. This cannot be considered as a provision delegating authority,
according to the main definition used in delegation studies. The problem, which our method
addresses, is that the lexicon measure does not detect that the subject of the sentence is ‘the
terms’ and not ‘the governor’.
8
Yet, we acknowledge that there are some errors made by our parser measure, which will
require more work in redefining the extraction rules in the future. For instance, delegations
contained in complex sentences are often not detected and therefore produce false negatives.
Such an example is: “Authority may be provided by statute for the Governor to assign and
reorganize functions among executive officers and agencies and their employees, other than
elective officers and agencies administered by elective officers.” The reason is that there
is no modal or verb (or combination of these two) which directly refers to delegation. The
action described in this sentence can be described as indirect delegation, as the statute under
discussion grants authority to a potential future statute that in turn can give authority to
the governor to perform an action.
An example of a false positive is “This local law shall take effect immediately, provided
the governor shall have approved the bill authorizing a thirty per centum tax.” The machine
codes this sentence as a delegation, as it ignores the helping verb “have” and identifies “shall
approve” as a strict modal + active verb. This is a good example of how the extraction
rules could be improved: by making them slighly more complex and de-classifying modal
constructions with an additional helping verb such as “have”. In principle the extraction
rules could be improved to address a number of these relatively infrequent issues. On the
other hand, as the system becomes more complex it could produce more errors, and it could
begin to overfit the hand-coded training set.
Overall, our hand coding metrics suggest that such errors are relatively uncommon. To
the extent that they are numerically important, any downstream empirical analysis is still
valid as long as the errors are uncorrelated with the treatment variable of interest. We
believe that the assumption of classical measurement error is reasonable in many empirical
contexts.
9
State Session Laws
The dataset consists of full text of US state session laws, namely the collection of statutes
enacted by a legislature, published every year or every two years from 1900 to 2000. The
collection of statutes was retrieved from heinonline.com. For old statutes, only the scanned
copy was available. Figure 2 shows the scanned copy of a page from a statute enacted in
the Texas Legislature for the 1889 session. As it can be seen, although the statute is old,
the quality of the digitised version is rather good.
It should be noted that the laws in the dataset give the flow, rather than the stock of
legislation. In other words, the dataset contains also statutes which amend or repeal previous
legislation or laws which failed or were vetoed. A team of research assistants was hired to
review samples of the dataset and found that the presence of these statutes do not vary
significantly within state over time.
The raw text was processed as follows. First, all pages were appended and non-statute
material (e.g. headers, footers, table of contents, indexes) was removed. Then, the text
was segmented into individual bills, acts and resolutions, using text markers (e.g. ‘Chapter’
followed by a number) to identify the start of a new statute. Indicators specific to some
states were also taken into consideration. Again, a team of research assistant checked the
validity of this segmentation process.
10
(a) Scanned Text (b) OCR
Figure 2: Example of State Session Law
11
Bureaucratic Discretion in US States
Introduction of Merit System
Table 2 shows the dates of the adoption of the merit systems across US states. We rely
on two main secondary sources, namely Ujhelyi (2014) and Ting, Snyder, Hirano and Folke
(2013). Where the dates are the same in these two sources, no further research is carried
out. Where these two dates differ, we look for further secondary and primary sources. In
some cases, no sources were available and hence we relied on Ujhelyi (2014) ‘as default’. In
those cases where we find that primary sources contradict his findings, we specify it in the
Notes column.
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Table 2: Dates of Adoption of Merit Systems
State Introduction Merit System Notes
Ujhelyi (2014) Ting et al. (2013) This Paper
AK 1960 1960 1960 Same
AL 1939 1939 1939 Same
AR 1969 1968 1969 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
AZ 1968 1968 1968 Same
CA 1913 1913 1913 Same
CO 1919 1918 1918 Colorado Constitution amended in 1918
CT 1937 1937 1937 Same
DE 1968 1966 1966 Law enacting merit system passed in 1966
FL 1967 1968 1967 Florida statute enacted in 1967
GA 1945 1953 1945 Georgia constitution amended in 1945
HI 1955 1955 1955 Same
IA 1967 1966 1966 Iowa Code enacted in 1966
ID 1967 1969 1967 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
IL 1905 1905 1905 Same
IN 1941 1941 1941 Same
KS 1941 1941 1941 Same
KY 1960 1954 1960 Law passed in 1960
LA 1952 1940 1952 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
MA 1885 1885 1885 Same
MD 1921 1921 1921 Same
ME 1937 1937 1937 Same
MI 1941 1937 1940 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
MN 1939 1939 1939 Same
MO 1945 1946 1945 Constitution amended in 1945
MS 1977 1976 1976 Code enacting merit system adopted in 1976
MT 1976 1976 1976 Same
NC 1949 1949 1949 Same
ND 1975 1974 1975 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NE 1975 1974 1975 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NH 1950 1954 1950 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NJ 1908 1908 1908 Same
NM 1961 1962 1961 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NV 1953 1953 1953 Same
NY 1883 1883 1883 Same
OH 1913 1913 1913 Same
OK 1959 1958 1959 Merit system adopted in 1959
OR 1945 1945 1945 Same
PA 1963 1968 1963 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
RI 1939 1939 1939 Same
SC 1969 1973 1969 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
SD 1973 1968 1973 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
TN 1937 1937 1937 Same
UT 1963 1962 1963 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
VA 1943 1942 1943 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
VT 1950 1950 1950 Same
WA 1961 1961 1961 Same
WI 1905 1905 1905 Same
WV 1989 1989 1989 Same
WY 1957 1956 1957 Personnel Act adopted in 195713
Introduction of Reference and Drafting System
Table 3 below shows the year of the introduction of a reference and drafting system in the
US states. We consider the date of introduction of a separate office purposefully in charge
of providing legislators help with the searching, storing and drafting of bills. Before the
establishment of such an office, these functions were usually performed to a certain degree by
the state librarians and/or the attorney general. Where information on the drafting system is
not available (for 25 states), we take into consideration the introduction of a reference system
(missing for 18 states). In most cases, the introduction of a reference system precedes the
introduction of a drafting system or they occur together. Information is gathered from the
following sources: Book of States 1935 Chapter 2, Rothstein (1990) and Squire (2012). In
those cases where information is not straightforward we add a note. As mentioned in the
main text, this information is present only for those states which established these services
before 1935. To our knowledge, after that date no information is present.
14
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Table 3: Dates of Introduction of Reference and Drafting System
State Legislative Reference Legislative Drafting
AL 1907 1907
AR 1917
AZ 1917 1917
CA 1904 1913
CO 1931 1931
CT 1907 1901
GA 1914 1929
IA 1911 1911
IL 1913 1913
IN 1907 1907
KS 1929 1929
LA 1921
MA 1910 1920
MD 1916 1916
ME 1917
MI 1907 1917
MT 1909
NC 1915 1915
ND 1909 1909
NE 1911 1911
NH 1913 1913
NJ 1914
NM 1921
NY 1890 1909
OH 1913 1913
PA 1909 1909
RI 1907 1926
SD 1907 1907
TX 1909
VA 1914 1914
VT 1911 1912
WI 1901 190116
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Divided Government 2,311 0.370 0.483 0 1
Introduction Civil Service 2,499 0.520 0.500 0 1
Introduction and Repeal Civil Service 2,550 0.506 0.500 0 1
Introduction of Drafting System 1,632 0.848 0.359 0 1
Log Delegation 2,497 8.355 0.913 3.219 11.09
Log Permission 2,497 7.542 0.984 2.485 10.32
Log Constraint 2,497 6.228 1.047 1.609 9.421
Log Entitlement 2,497 7.980 0.940 2.833 10.69
Log Total Provisions 2,497 9.173 0.935 4.094 11.93
Reform Year Dummy 2,550 0.0184 0.135 0 1
17
Robustness Checks
Table 5 below shows the effect of the introduction of the merit system on the different
types of provisions, namely entitlements, constraints, permissions and delegations. Results
in Table 6 show that in those years there is no effect of divided government on legislative
complexity.
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Table 6: The Effect of the Divided Government on the Number
of Provisions in Years with No Merit System
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Leg Detail Leg Detail Leg Detail
Divided Government 0.0139 -0.00556 0.00573
(0.0577) (0.0664) (0.0710)
Constant 8.631 -0.102 190.8
(0.0142) (72.36) (143.9)
Observations 974 554 508
State FE X X X
Time FE X X
State-Specific Trends X X
Controls X X
Lagged DV X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with
state fixed effects. Column 2 adds year fixed effects, time-varying controls
(introduction of drafting system) and state-specific time trends. Column
3 adds the lagged dependent variable. In all models standard errors are
clustered by state.
20
Executive Delegation in US States
Descriptive Statistics
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Unified Government 2,311 0.630 0.483 0 1
Delegation Ratio Gov 3,985 0.754 0.160 0 1
Delegation Ratio 2,497 0.336 0.0784 0 0.596
Constraint Ratio 2,497 0.0295 0.0504 0 0.298
Executive Delegation 2,497 0.325 0.0722 0 0.532
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Figure 3: Effect of Unified Government on the Executive Delegation to the Governor
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Robustness Checks
Figure 3 shows the binned scatterplot from the multivariate regression above. This is a
non-parametric method of plotting the conditional expectation function (which describes
the average y-value for each x-value). To make the figure, we regressed the independent
and dependent variables on the control variables (in this case, state, and year dummies)
and generated residuals. Then, we grouped the residualized variable in the horizontal axis
into 23 equal-sized bins, computed the mean of the residuals of each variable within each
bin and created a scatterplot of these 23 data points. Each point shows the average level
of delegation for a given level of unified government, holding the controls constant. The
positive coefficient in the regression is reflected in the positive slope in the figure. And we
can see that it is not driven by outliers.
Table 8 and Table 9 shows the results with ‘Delegation Ratio’ (Di/M) and ‘Delegation
Ratio Gov’ (Di/Mi) as dependent variable, respectively.
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Table 8: Effect of Unified Government on the Delegation Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Delegation Ratio Delegation Ratio Delegation Ratio
Unified Government 0.00774 0.00689 0.00679
(0.00384) (0.00266) (0.00305)
Constant 0.334 0.336 0.777
(0.00240) (0.0338) (0.0387)
Observations 2,259 2,208 2,212
State FE X X X
Year FE X X X
State-time Trends X X
Lagged DV X
Civil Service X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state and biennium fixed
effects. Column 2 adds state-specific time trends and the lagged dependent variable. Column 3
adds the introduction of an independent civil service as control. In all models standard errors
are clustered by state.
23
Table 9: Effect of Unified Government on the Delegation Ratio Gov
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Delegation Ratio Gov Delegation Ratio Gov Delegation Ratio Gov
Unified Government 0.00897 0.00806 0.00803
(0.00520) (0.00420) (0.00435)
Constant 0.789 0.0991 0.298
(0.00325) (0.0758) (0.0600)
Observations 2,259 2,208 2,212
State FE X X X
Year FE X X X
State-time Trends X X
Lagged DV X
Civil Service X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state and biennium fixed effects. Column
2 adds state-specific time trends and the lagged dependent variable. Column 3 adds the introduction of an
independent civil service as control. In all models standard errors are clustered by state.
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Syntactic Parsing
The final stage of the process is to match the lexical and syntactic structure of the provision
types with that of the sentences in the text. We then extract the number of delegations,
prohibitions, and so on for each jurisdiction and over time. We also have material associated
information, such as who or what is the subject of the provision. For example, in the second
application below, we identify provisions where the subject is for the term ‘governor.’ 1
Although several parsing methods are present, we use dependency parsing, as suggested
by recent developments in NLP (Dell’Orletta, Marchi, Montemagni, Plank and Venturi,
2012, Montemagni and Venturi, 2013). The parser models sentence structure over the words
contained in the sentence and the grammatical relations between them (Jurafsky and James,
2000). A dependency relation consists of a headword and a dependent word, related to each
other through a functional dependency. Examples of functions are nominal subject, direct
object, and so on. More formally, a dependency structure G = (V,A) consists of vertices V ,
the set of words in a sentence, and arcs A, the head-dependent and grammatical relations
(Jurafsky and James, 2000, Choi and Palmer, 2012). Usually, dependencies are displayed
as (projective) ‘parse trees’, which represent the relations between words in a recursive
hierarchical structure. Dependency trees are graphs where: 1) there is a single head, with no
incoming arc; 2) each vertex (apart from the head) has at least one incoming arc; 3) there is
a unique path from the root node to each vertex (Jurafsky and James, 2000, Goldberg and
Nivre, 2012). In the Appendix, we show an example of a dependency parse tree.
The widely used transition-based parsing algorithm works as follows (Jurafsky and James,
2000, bird, klein and loper, 2009, Goldberg and Nivre, 2012, Honnibal, Johnson et al., 2015).
The input is a list of tokens. The algorithm works through three transition operators, applied
to the list of tokens: 1) the LEFT action asserts a head-dependent relation between the top
word in the ‘stack’ (the list of words yet to be processed) and the one beneath and removes
1A subtler approach in future work could identify synonyms for governor, using WordNet or using word
embeddings (Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado and Dean, 2013).
2
the lower word from the stack; 2) the RIGHT action asserts a head-dependent relation
between the first and second words in the stack and removes the word at the top; 3) the
SHIFT action removes the word from the initial list of tokens and places it into the stack.
To speed up the parser, the algorithm is greedy: once a dependency has been assigned,
the token is removed from the stack and cannot be reassigned. For every token in the
sentence, the parser consults a rulebook (the so-called ‘oracle’) that returns a transition
(LEFT, RIGHT, or SHIFT) based on the current state. This ‘oracle’, a key piece of the
parser software, is constructed by the developers to optimize accurate parsing based on
training data.
The parser is trained on an annotated corpus of standard English articles. This corpus
does not include legal documents. But we find that it does quite well on most sentences in
our corpus of statutes.
We apply these parser methods to the text of state statutes. Although several implemen-
tations are available, such as SyntaxNet, NLTK, and CoreNLP, in this work we use spaCy,
one of the most accurate and fastest parsers available today (Choi, Tetreault and Stent, 2015,
Honnibal, Johnson et al., 2015). 2 After each sentence is parsed, we match up the extracted
dependency relations to our set of syntactic units for delegations, prohibitions, and so on.
If a sentence matches one of these categories, it is counted as a legal provision. To measure
legislative detail, we count the number of legal provisions published in the state session laws
for each state and each biennium.
The following sentences are from the California Government Code 11508 - (a) and 65852
- (a): “The agency shall consult the office, and subject to the availability of its staff, shall
determine the time and place of the hearing”; “A local agency may, by ordinance, provide for
the creation of accessory dwelling units in areas zoned to allow single-family or multifamily
2spaCy uses a transition-based approach, similar to the one described above (Choi and Palmer, 2012).
The ‘oracle’ used by spaCy is from Goldberg and Nivre (2012). Several minor technical features make
spaCy more complex than a simple transition-based parser, such as the use of an improved non-monotonic
transition system, which relaxes the greedy algorithm approach and allows the parser to ‘go back’ on its
decisions (Honnibal, Johnson et al., 2015).
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use”. Below in Figure A1, we provide the dependence trees for parts of these two sentence.
3 The letters below the words represent the part of speech (POS) tags. A prerequisite of
syntactic dependency parsing, indeed, is POS tagging. The latter assigns labels (‘tags’) to
the tokens in a sentence according to their function, such as noun, verb, and adjective.4 For
instance, in the sentence above, ‘(the) agency’ is a noun and ‘consult’ is a verb. Although
POS tagging provides important information on the single token, it does not say much about
the token’s relations with the other tokens in a sentence. This is where dependency parsing
comes into play.
The arcs above the sentence in Figure 1a represent the syntactic relations between words.
First of all, the parser identifies the head of the sentence, normally the main verb (‘consult’
and ‘provide’, respectively in the first and second sentence). The parser then identifies
the subject of the sentence (‘the agency’ and ‘a local agency’, respectively in the first and
second sentence) through the nominal subject (nsubj) relation. The subject may also be a
clause. Finally, the parser looks at the other side of the sentence and, in the case of the
second sentence, identifies two prepositions, namely ‘for’ and ‘of’, and two objects of this
preposition, namely ‘the creation’ and ‘accessory dwelling units’, or in the case of the first
sentence, directly the object ‘the office’. 5
As it can be seen, the first sentence is a delegation, as it is an active and positive sentence
which contain a strict modal, namely ‘shall’. This is close in spirit to the ‘the Agent shall
act’ example of delegation provided above. Conversely, the second sentence is a permission,
as it is positive and active, with a permissive modal, namely ‘may’, followed by a normal
verb. This is very similar to the ‘the Agent may act’ example of permission discussed above.
Table 1 shows an example of the results of the data building step (i.e. a single observation
in the new dataset created). This is an example of a permission, with governor as subject. In
this case the Governor is allowed to give the prize ‘Arkansas Traveler’ to every individual she
3This figure is taken from displaCy, a graphical interface for Spacy, the dependency parser used here.
4A full list of POS tags can be found here (accessed June 2017).
5 A full list of dependencies can be found in De Marneffe and Manning (2008).
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(a) Delegation
(b) Permission
Figure 1: Dependency Parse Tree
5
Table 1: Example of Permission
Full sentence
[...]the Governor of the State of Arkansas be authorized to designate and appoint
distinguished visitors, citizens, and former citizens, who have distinguished
themselves in various fields of endeavor as an Arkansas Traveler
Subject tags ’DT’, ’NNP’, ’IN’, ’DT’, ’NNP’, ’IN’, ’NNP’
Subject branch ’the’, ’governor’, ’of’, ’the’, ’state’, ’of’, ’arkansas’
Verb ’authorize’
Permission verb True
Passive True
Subject ’Governor’
Object tags
[’IN’], [’TO’, ’VB’, ’CC’, ’VB’, ’JJ’, ’NNS’, ’,’, ’NNS’, ’,’, ’CC’, ’JJ’, ’NNS’, ’,’,
’WP’, ’VBP’, ’VBN’, ’PRP’, ’IN’, ’JJ’, ’NNS’, ’IN’, ’NN’,
’IN’, ’DT’, ’NNP’, ’NNP’, ’,’], [’VB’]
Object branches
[’that’], [’to’, ’designate’, ’and’, ’appoint’, ’distinguished’,
’visitor’, ’,’, ’citizen’, ’,’, ’and’, ’former’, ’citizen’, ’,’, ’who’, ’have’,
’distinguish’, ’-pron-’, ’in’, ’various’, ’field’, ’of’, ’endeavor’, ’as’,
’an’, ’arkansas’, ’traveler’, ’,’], [’be’]
feels worthy of this award. One of the main advantages of the new approach proposed above
is that not only does it allow classifying statements according to their content, but it also
allows to detect the subject of the statement. This in turn allows to extrapolate information
on who is bound or entitled to do what.
We inspect a random sample of 500 provisions to understand how the different extraction
rules apply. In this sub-sample there are 45 permissions, 74 delegations, 63 entitlements
and 10 constraints. Almost 40 per cent of the sample is covered by our extraction rules.
Most of the sentences not detected by our extraction rules are procedural provisions, mostly
amendments, repeals or provisions discussing the application of the law. An example of
amendment is: “Section twenty-six-a of such law is amended by adding a new subdivision
fourteen to read as follows”. An example of repeal is: “Section 19-418a of the general
statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof”. This is an example of a
provision discussing the entering into force of an act: “This act is effective immediately upon
completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8
of the Wyoming Constitution”. These provisions contain important legal information, but do
not affect the level of discretion left to bureaucrats or even the power delegated to a specific
6
governmental body.
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Further Validation
We carried out blind hand-coding on a sub-sample of provisions delegating authority to the
governor according to the instructions used in Epstein and O’Halloran 1999 book (p.398).
In those instructions, a delegation is defined as ‘any provisions that gives the [governor] the
authority to move policy away from the status quo’. Examples provided are: the autho-
rization of a new program, discretion to make or modify decision-making criteria, creation
of a new commission, board, agency etc. Then, we run some tests to validate our parser
measure: the precision score (number of true positives over number of true positives and
false positives) is 0.81, recall (number of true positives over number of true positives and
false negatives) is 0.92 and f1-score (harmonic mean of precision and recall) is 0.86. Overall,
our parser measure replicates the hand coding quite well.
Here is an example of a true positive, from a 1965 statute from Illinois: “Within sixty
days after this act becomes effective, the governor, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint three commissioners to enter into a compact on behalf of the state
of Illinois with the state of Missouri.” This clearly falls within one of the main examples of
delegation provided in the Appendix of the Epstein and O’Halloran 1999 book: “the creation
of a new commission, board, or agency” (p.293). It should be noted that our parser measure
correctly identifies in this case the governor as the subject of the sentence and hence the
government body to which authority is delegated.
A lexicon measure looking for the bi-gram ‘governor shall’ will produce a false negative
in the example above. A lexicon measure will also produce many false positives, as shown in
this example: “The terms of office of the members of the commission to be appointed by the
governor shall be for six years”. In this case, a lexicon measure will detect this provision as
a delegation to the governor. This cannot be considered as a provision delegating authority,
according to the main definition used in delegation studies. The problem, which our method
addresses, is that the lexicon measure does not detect that the subject of the sentence is ‘the
terms’ and not ‘the governor’.
8
Yet, we acknowledge that there are some errors made by our parser measure, which will
require more work in redefining the extraction rules in the future. For instance, delegations
contained in complex sentences are often not detected and therefore produce false negatives.
Such an example is: “Authority may be provided by statute for the Governor to assign and
reorganize functions among executive officers and agencies and their employees, other than
elective officers and agencies administered by elective officers.” The reason is that there
is no modal or verb (or combination of these two) which directly refers to delegation. The
action described in this sentence can be described as indirect delegation, as the statute under
discussion grants authority to a potential future statute that in turn can give authority to
the governor to perform an action.
An example of a false positive is “This local law shall take effect immediately, provided
the governor shall have approved the bill authorizing a thirty per centum tax.” The machine
codes this sentence as a delegation, as it ignores the helping verb “have” and identifies “shall
approve” as a strict modal + active verb. This is a good example of how the extraction
rules could be improved: by making them slighly more complex and de-classifying modal
constructions with an additional helping verb such as “have”. In principle the extraction
rules could be improved to address a number of these relatively infrequent issues. On the
other hand, as the system becomes more complex it could produce more errors, and it could
begin to overfit the hand-coded training set.
Overall, our hand coding metrics suggest that such errors are relatively uncommon. To
the extent that they are numerically important, any downstream empirical analysis is still
valid as long as the errors are uncorrelated with the treatment variable of interest. We
believe that the assumption of classical measurement error is reasonable in many empirical
contexts.
9
State Session Laws
The dataset consists of full text of US state session laws, namely the collection of statutes
enacted by a legislature, published every year or every two years from 1900 to 2000. The
collection of statutes was retrieved from heinonline.com. For old statutes, only the scanned
copy was available. Figure 2 shows the scanned copy of a page from a statute enacted in
the Texas Legislature for the 1889 session. As it can be seen, although the statute is old,
the quality of the digitised version is rather good.
It should be noted that the laws in the dataset give the flow, rather than the stock of
legislation. In other words, the dataset contains also statutes which amend or repeal previous
legislation or laws which failed or were vetoed. A team of research assistants was hired to
review samples of the dataset and found that the presence of these statutes do not vary
significantly within state over time.
The raw text was processed as follows. First, all pages were appended and non-statute
material (e.g. headers, footers, table of contents, indexes) was removed. Then, the text
was segmented into individual bills, acts and resolutions, using text markers (e.g. ‘Chapter’
followed by a number) to identify the start of a new statute. Indicators specific to some
states were also taken into consideration. Again, a team of research assistant checked the
validity of this segmentation process.
10
(a) Scanned Text (b) OCR
Figure 2: Example of State Session Law
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Bureaucratic Discretion in US States
Introduction of Merit System
Table 2 shows the dates of the adoption of the merit systems across US states. We rely
on two main secondary sources, namely Ujhelyi (2014) and Ting, Snyder, Hirano and Folke
(2013). Where the dates are the same in these two sources, no further research is carried
out. Where these two dates differ, we look for further secondary and primary sources. In
some cases, no sources were available and hence we relied on Ujhelyi (2014) ‘as default’. In
those cases where we find that primary sources contradict his findings, we specify it in the
Notes column.
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Table 2: Dates of Adoption of Merit Systems
State Introduction Merit System Notes
Ujhelyi (2014) Ting et al. (2013) This Paper
AK 1960 1960 1960 Same
AL 1939 1939 1939 Same
AR 1969 1968 1969 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
AZ 1968 1968 1968 Same
CA 1913 1913 1913 Same
CO 1919 1918 1918 Colorado Constitution amended in 1918
CT 1937 1937 1937 Same
DE 1968 1966 1966 Law enacting merit system passed in 1966
FL 1967 1968 1967 Florida statute enacted in 1967
GA 1945 1953 1945 Georgia constitution amended in 1945
HI 1955 1955 1955 Same
IA 1967 1966 1966 Iowa Code enacted in 1966
ID 1967 1969 1967 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
IL 1905 1905 1905 Same
IN 1941 1941 1941 Same
KS 1941 1941 1941 Same
KY 1960 1954 1960 Law passed in 1960
LA 1952 1940 1952 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
MA 1885 1885 1885 Same
MD 1921 1921 1921 Same
ME 1937 1937 1937 Same
MI 1941 1937 1940 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
MN 1939 1939 1939 Same
MO 1945 1946 1945 Constitution amended in 1945
MS 1977 1976 1976 Code enacting merit system adopted in 1976
MT 1976 1976 1976 Same
NC 1949 1949 1949 Same
ND 1975 1974 1975 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NE 1975 1974 1975 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NH 1950 1954 1950 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NJ 1908 1908 1908 Same
NM 1961 1962 1961 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
NV 1953 1953 1953 Same
NY 1883 1883 1883 Same
OH 1913 1913 1913 Same
OK 1959 1958 1959 Merit system adopted in 1959
OR 1945 1945 1945 Same
PA 1963 1968 1963 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
RI 1939 1939 1939 Same
SC 1969 1973 1969 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
SD 1973 1968 1973 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
TN 1937 1937 1937 Same
UT 1963 1962 1963 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
VA 1943 1942 1943 Ujhelyi (2014) as default
VT 1950 1950 1950 Same
WA 1961 1961 1961 Same
WI 1905 1905 1905 Same
WV 1989 1989 1989 Same
WY 1957 1956 1957 Personnel Act adopted in 195713
Introduction of Reference and Drafting System
Table 3 below shows the year of the introduction of a reference and drafting system in the
US states. We consider the date of introduction of a separate office purposefully in charge
of providing legislators help with the searching, storing and drafting of bills. Before the
establishment of such an office, these functions were usually performed to a certain degree by
the state librarians and/or the attorney general. Where information on the drafting system is
not available (for 25 states), we take into consideration the introduction of a reference system
(missing for 18 states). In most cases, the introduction of a reference system precedes the
introduction of a drafting system or they occur together. Information is gathered from the
following sources: Book of States 1935 Chapter 2, Rothstein (1990) and Squire (2012). In
those cases where information is not straightforward we add a note. As mentioned in the
main text, this information is present only for those states which established these services
before 1935. To our knowledge, after that date no information is present.
14
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Table 3: Dates of Introduction of Reference and Drafting System
State Legislative Reference Legislative Drafting
AL 1907 1907
AR 1917
AZ 1917 1917
CA 1904 1913
CO 1931 1931
CT 1907 1901
GA 1914 1929
IA 1911 1911
IL 1913 1913
IN 1907 1907
KS 1929 1929
LA 1921
MA 1910 1920
MD 1916 1916
ME 1917
MI 1907 1917
MT 1909
NC 1915 1915
ND 1909 1909
NE 1911 1911
NH 1913 1913
NJ 1914
NM 1921
NY 1890 1909
OH 1913 1913
PA 1909 1909
RI 1907 1926
SD 1907 1907
TX 1909
VA 1914 1914
VT 1911 1912
WI 1901 190116
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Divided Government 2,311 0.370 0.483 0 1
Introduction Civil Service 2,499 0.520 0.500 0 1
Introduction and Repeal Civil Service 2,550 0.506 0.500 0 1
Introduction of Drafting System 1,632 0.848 0.359 0 1
Log Delegation 2,497 8.355 0.913 3.219 11.09
Log Permission 2,497 7.542 0.984 2.485 10.32
Log Constraint 2,497 6.228 1.047 1.609 9.421
Log Entitlement 2,497 7.980 0.940 2.833 10.69
Log Total Provisions 2,497 9.173 0.935 4.094 11.93
Reform Year Dummy 2,550 0.0184 0.135 0 1
17
Robustness Checks
Table 5 below shows the effect of the introduction of the merit system on the different
types of provisions, namely entitlements, constraints, permissions and delegations. Results
in Table 6 show that in those years there is no effect of divided government on legislative
complexity.
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Table 6: The Effect of the Divided Government on the Number
of Provisions in Years with No Merit System
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Leg Detail Leg Detail Leg Detail
Divided Government 0.0139 -0.00556 0.00573
(0.0563) (0.0644) (0.0687)
Observations 973 554 508
State FE X X X
Time FE X X
State-Specific Trends X X
Controls X X
Lagged DV X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with
state fixed effects. Column 2 adds year fixed effects, time-varying controls
(introduction of drafting system) and state-specific time trends. Column
3 adds the lagged dependent variable. In all models standard errors are
clustered by state.
20
Executive Delegation in US States
Descriptive Statistics
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Unified Government 2,311 0.630 0.483 0 1
Delegation Ratio Gov 3,985 0.754 0.160 0 1
Delegation Ratio 2,497 0.336 0.0784 0 0.596
Constraint Ratio 2,497 0.0295 0.0504 0 0.298
Executive Delegation 2,497 0.325 0.0722 0 0.532
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Figure 3: Effect of Unified Government on the Executive Delegation to the Governor
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Robustness Checks
Figure 3 shows the binned scatterplot from the multivariate regression above. This is a
non-parametric method of plotting the conditional expectation function (which describes
the average y-value for each x-value). To make the figure, we regressed the independent
and dependent variables on the control variables (in this case, state, and year dummies)
and generated residuals. Then, we grouped the residualized variable in the horizontal axis
into 23 equal-sized bins, computed the mean of the residuals of each variable within each
bin and created a scatterplot of these 23 data points. Each point shows the average level
of delegation for a given level of unified government, holding the controls constant. The
positive coefficient in the regression is reflected in the positive slope in the figure. And we
can see that it is not driven by outliers.
Table 8 and Table 9 shows the results with ‘Delegation Ratio’ (Di/M) and ‘Delegation
Ratio Gov’ (Di/Mi) as dependent variable, respectively.
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Table 8: Effect of Unified Government on the Delegation Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Delegation Ratio Delegation Ratio Delegation Ratio
Unified Government 0.00774 0.00689 0.00679
(0.00384) (0.00266) (0.00305)
Observations 2,270 2,185 2,223
State FE X X X
Year FE X X X
State-time Trends X X
Lagged DV X
Civil Service X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state and biennium fixed
effects. Column 2 adds state-specific time trends and the lagged dependent variable. Column 3
adds the introduction of an independent civil service as control. In all models standard errors
are clustered by state.
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Table 9: Effect of Unified Government on the Delegation Ratio Gov
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Delegation Ratio Gov Delegation Ratio Gov Delegation Ratio Gov
Unified Government 0.00897 0.00806 0.00803
(0.00520) (0.00420) (0.00435)
Observations 2,268 2,225 2,221
State FE X X X
Year FE X X X
State-time Trends X X
Lagged DV X
Civil Service X
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the OLS regression model with state and biennium fixed effects. Column
2 adds state-specific time trends and the lagged dependent variable. Column 3 adds the introduction of an
independent civil service as control. In all models standard errors are clustered by state.
24
References
bird, steven, ewan klein and edward loper. 2009. “Natural language processing with python.”.
Choi, Jinho D, Joel R Tetreault and Amanda Stent. 2015. “It Depends: Dependency Parser
Comparison Using A Web-based Evaluation Tool.” ACL pp. 387–396.
Choi, Jinho D and Martha Palmer. 2012. “Guidelines for the CLEAR Style Constituent to
Dependency Conversion.” Center for Computational Language and EducAtion Research ,
University of Colorado Boulder , Institute of Cognitive Science, Technical Report 01-12 .
De Marneffe, Marie-Catherine and Christopher D Manning. 2008. Stanford typed depen-
dencies manual. Technical report Technical Report, Stanford University.
Dell’Orletta, Felice, Simone Marchi, Simonetta Montemagni, Barbara Plank and Giulia Ven-
turi. 2012. The SPLeT-2012 shared task on dependency parsing of legal texts. In Proceed-
ings of the 4th Workshop on Semantic Processing of Legal Texts.
Goldberg, Yoav and Joakim Nivre. 2012. “A Dynamic Oracle for Arc-Eager Dependency
Parsing.” Proceedings of COLING 2012: Technical Papers, COLING 2012, Mumbai, De-
cember 2012. pp. 959–976.
Honnibal, Matthew, Mark Johnson et al. 2015. “An Improved Non-monotonic Transition Sys-
tem for Dependency Parsing.” Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on Empirical Methods
in Natural Language Processing, Lisbon, Portugal, 17-21 September 2015 pp. 1373–1378.
Jurafsky, Daniel and H James. 2000. Speech and Language Processing: an Introduction
to Natural Language Processing, Computational Linguistics, and Speech. London, UK:
Pearson Education.
Mikolov, Tomas, Ilya Sutskever, Kai Chen, Greg S Corrado and Jeff Dean. 2013. Distributed
Representations of Words and Phrases and their Compositionality. In Advances in Neu-
25
ral Information Processing Systems 26, ed. C. J. C. Burges, L. Bottou, M. Welling, Z.
Ghahramani and K. Q. Weinberger. Curran Associates, Inc. pp. 3111–3119.
Montemagni, Simonetta and Giulia Venturi. 2013. “Natural Language Processing And Legal
Knowledge Extraction.”.
Rothstein, Samuel. 1990. “The Origins of Legislative Reference Services in the United States.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly pp. 401–411.
Squire, P. 2012. The Evolution of American Legislatures: Colonies, Territories, and States,
1619-2009. Legislative Politics And Policy Making Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press.
URL: https://books.google.it/books?id=5uw_e0pgMQMC
Ting, Michael M, James M Snyder, Shigeo Hirano and Olle Folke. 2013. “Elections and
reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the US states.” Journal of Theoretical
Politics 25(3):363–387.
Ujhelyi, Gergely. 2014. “Civil service rules and policy choices: evidence from US state
governments.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6(2):338–380.
26
